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A 
s Sherman (this issue) notes, I tried (Alexander 1990) to determine 
“the extent to which social learning, especially without self-ref- 
erence, can account for the kin recognition findings of different 
investigators with different organisms . . . (p. 273). I had two mo- 
tivations. First, I have had difftculty modeling the evolution of kin recog- 
nition via mechanisms that can function in the absence of social learning 
(Alexander and Borgia 1978; Alexander 1979, 1990). Second, it seemed to 
me that virtually all investigators of kin recognition were searching for un- 
usual or cryptic mechanisms like use of self (without additional referents. 
Alexander 1979, 1990) or so-called “recognition alleles” or “genetic 
models,” and partly for that reason were in danger of biasing themselves 
away from thorough searches for opportunities for social learning. I think 
I provided evidence that the second argument is sometimes appropriate, by 
showing that several results previously regarded as unexplainable except as 
a result of self-referencing may indeed be outcomes of social learning op- 
portunities that had been overlooked. Examples are Holmes’ (1986b) results 
with paternal half siblings in ground squirrels and Sherman and Holmes’ 
(1985) results with full and (maternal) half sister discrimination in ground 
squirrels. In Holmes’ experiment, juvenile ground squirrels were in fact 
exposed to the traits of fathers they shared with unfamiliar (nonlittermate) 
paternal half siblings through littermates that also shared that father. For 
the more complicated case of full and (maternal) half sisters in ground squir- 
rels, I provided non-intuitive predictions (Alexander 1990, p. 277) that can 
be used to test my hypothesis based on imperfect social learning. 
I also tried to explain two effects that might be mistaken for either self- 
referencing or “recognition alleles.” The first is that imperfections in social 
learning can give the impression of unusual mechanisms by causing organ- 
isms to behave as though they recognize relatives with which they have not 
associated when in fact they are simply mistaking them for associates. I 
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showed that such a hypothesis seems to account for the various results of 
kin recognition experiments in sweat bees. The second is that effects evolved 
as an aspect of mate choice, or in other contexts different from kin recog- 
nition, can give the impression of evolved kin recognition (see also Grafen 
1990) but do not present the theoretical problems that I think self-recognition 
or recognition alleles do for kin recognition. I suggested examples in which 
this might be the case (see also below). 
Social learning, as I am discussing it, implies that the animal evolves 
to learn who its actual associates are and to remember them, and that the 
learning evolves because associates in a particular stage and circumstance 
have during evolution represented kin of the kind appropriate to whatever 
is learned or done as a result of the learning. In this kind of kin recognition 
the only comparing or matching of phenotypes is consecutive matching of 
the associate’s phenotype against what was originally learned about it. In 
experiments, whether or not the particular traits possessed by an associate 
are like those of relatives is irrelevant. This mechanism is thus implied when- 
ever non-relatives can be caused to treat one another as if they were relatives 
or individuals can be caused to imprint to bizarre objects. The questions 
whether or not in particular cases learning of associates is cumulative, con- 
tinues for long periods, involves recognizing individual kin as opposed to 
classes of kin, or evolves to enable “recognition” of strangers appear still 
to be unanswered (but see below). 
Sherman’s efforts to support self-referencing from existing evidence on 
honey bees and ground squirrels have enabled me to see that the results of 
the authors he cites-Visscher (1986), Getz and Smith (1983), Breed et al. 
(19854, Frumhoff and Schneider (1987), Evers and Seeley (1986), Noonan 
(1986), and Holmes (1986a, b)-may also turn out to be explainable either 
as imperfect social learning or as effects evolved outside the context of kin 
recognition. 
As Sherman relates, Visscher caused honey bee larvae to be nursed by 
unrelated workers. When these larvae pupated, he returned the pupae to 
combs populated by sister workers. There the pupae eventually emerged as 
callow adults and presumably were groomed and fed by their sisters during 
the precise period that, for example, sweat bee callows learn who their 
nestmates are (Greenberg 1979; Buckle and Greenberg, 1981); on this ac- 
count, it is not reasonable to argue that these honey bees must have been 
using themselves as references because they had no opportunity to learn 
from their sisters’ phenotypes. To counter this argument, Sherman cites the 
experiments of Getz and Smith (1986), who found that female honey bees 
who spent their callow period with a maternal half sister later behaved ap- 
proximately the same toward full sisters and toward half sisters who had 
the same father as the sister with which they had spent the callow period. 
Getz and Smith believed that this result indicated use of self as well as 
associates. To make this interpretation, however, it is necessary to dem- 
onstrate that the bees (1) did not learn about their patrilines’ attributes while 
An Addendum and Reply to Sherman 389 
larvae and (2) could not have been treating their full and half sisters alike 
solely as a result of their common maternal inheritance (i.e., because of 
imperfect social learning). Neither question has been answered. It is un- 
satisfying to depend upon a failure to distinguish different kinds of relatives 
as the sole evidence against imperfect social learning; when social learning 
is imperfect enough, in particular ways, it gives precisely this result. 
To counter this argument, Sherman cites Visscher’s finding that workers 
reared “significantly more” larvae from queen-destined eggs related to the 
workers’ associates while they were callows than from those related to the 
workers’ nurses (which were not related to the workers they nursed). Sher- 
man seems to believe that this demonstrates that social learning does not 
occur in honeybee larvae. This experiment, however, was obviously not 
designed to show any such thing, and it does not. All we really know from 
all these various experiments is that imperfect social learning apparently 
occurs in callow adult honeybees, and the possibility of it occurring in larvae 
has not been excluded. Whether or not imperfect social learning explains 
all special reactions of honeybees to their nestmates, as it apparently does 
in sweat bees, remains unknown because appropriate experiments have not 
yet been conducted. 
The work of Breed et al. (1985), cited by Sherman as comparable to 
Getz and Smith’s work and supporting it, is vulnerable to criticisms similar 
to those given above if it is argued to demonstrate self-referencing. Breed 
et al. (and Getz and Smith) found that honeybee workers caged as adults 
with both sisters and nonsisters (the latter sisters of one another) respond 
with approximately equal levels of aggression to introduced unrelated fe- 
males like those with which they are caged and to introduced (strange) own 
sisters. In Breed et al.‘s experiments, because in 20% of tests as well as 
20% of controls there was biting and stinging, one is not inclined to argue 
for a refined recognition system based on genetically varying attributes; 
similarly, sistersof the introduced bee were as likely as nonsisters to initiate 
attacks (both findings suggesting an environmental aspect to “recognition” 
of nestmates). But Breed et al. did find in this experimental situation that 
“bees interacted significantly more often with sisters than with nonsisters,” 
and there was “a [nonsignificant] trend for bees to be involved in more 
feeding interactions with sisters” [than with nonsisters] (p. 3058). Because 
all of these females were fed by their sisters when they were larvae, Breed 
et al.‘s findings are consistent with an imperfect social learning model that 
allows learning by either larval or adult stages of honeybees (or both). This 
interpretation, moreover, might be regarded as reasonable because feeding 
is at least the principal social interaction in which larvae are involved, and 
aggression is restricted to adult bees. 
Three experiments cited by Sherman, but not emphasized or discussed 
in detail (Frumhoff and Schneider 1987; Noonan 1986; and Evers and Seeley 
1986; see also Noonan and Kolmes 1989, and below), may involve expla- 
nations other than kin recognition. In each case the authors used male honey 
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bees from two different strains of bees to produce full and (maternal) half 
sisters within nests and then showed that full and half sisters produced in 
this fashion treated each other differently, either attacking half sisters more 
frequently (Evers and Seeley), grooming and feeding full sisters more fre- 
quently (Frumhoff and Schneider; Noonan and Kolmes), or differentially 
rearing full sisters as queens (Noonan). All of these authors emphasized a 
single locus difference between the two kinds of sires which affects color 
of offspring, thus allowing them to be separated by human observers. In 
fact, the bees almost certainly differed in numerous loci and represented 
different strains or “races” of bees. Accordingly, there is a distinct possi- 
bility-discussed by Noonan (1986), Noonan and Kolmes (1989), Carlin 
(1989), Carlin and Frumhoff (1990), and Visscher and Seeley (unpublished)- 
that the response being given in both cases may reflect not evolved reactions 
to full and half siblings but something else, such as ability to react to either 
conspecific or heterospecific intruders in the hive. 
There is another problem with the first two of these studies-and in 
fact nearly all studies that have reported distinguishing of full and half sib- 
lings in the absence of social learning. To the extent that the biases of the 
investigators involved in these studies favor the detection of unusual (that 
is, not socially learned) mechanisms of kin recognition, we are justified in 
requiring that the behavioral observations be carried out by investigators 
who are blind to the reasons for the test and the significance of the results. 
We are actually justified in this requirement whether or not there is evidence 
of directional bias among investigators, especially when the observations 
require subjectivity and interpretation. This may often be the case when 
aggression or other behaviors cannot be identified unequivocally, and when 
it is important to identify the initiator of an interaction and this fact cannot 
be determined unequivocally. Most investigators have not even mentioned 
the topic or discussed the degree of subjectivity or objectivity of their ob- 
servations. The study of Noonan (1986) was blind with respect to the genetic 
relatedness of workers and the larvae they were tending because the genetic 
markers useful in adults are not apparent in larvae. Noonan’s results are, 
however (as already noted), subject to the criticism that the genetic markers 
used may not be behaviorally “neutral” (see especially Carlin 1989; Visscher 
and Seeley, unpublished). 
The challenge I am making here obviously does not imply that any 
investigator is dishonest. Everyone is aware that even inadvertent biases 
can influence results of experiments, and that is the reason for the universal 
requirement in scientific work for the stipulation I am discussing, which, 
curiously, has been ignored by investigators, referees, editors, and readers 
in experiments on both honey bees and ground squirrels. Waldmann et al. 
(1988) and Visscher and Seeley (unpublished) have made the same point; 
Visscher and Seeley (personal communication) have noted further that when 
“the magnitude of kinship-related differences . . . is small, the possibility 
of small bias effects [is] especially worrisome.” 
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My arguments on all of the above points (which I have made for years 
to several of the involved investigators) seem strengthened by a series of 
papers published after the manuscript of Alexander (1990) was submitted 
(Carlin 1989; Carlin and Frumhoff 1990; Oldroyd et al. 1990; Page and Rob- 
inson 1990; Grafen 1990). Carlin (1989) argues that “in at least some ex- 
periments” with honey bees “degree of genetic heterogeneity within arti- 
ficially constituted colonies, and hence the differentiability of matrilines and 
patrilines, is unrealistically high,” and that “kin biases [in experiments “con- 
ducted under approximately normal conditions”] “have proven to be sur- 
prisingly slight” within honey bee colopies (p. 93) (see also Carlin and Frum- 
hoff 1990). Carlin (1989) and Carlin and Frumhoff (1990) argue that workers 
should rear only full sisters to be queens if they can recognize them compared 
to half sisters. Page and Robinson (1990, p. 1708) acknowledge that the result 
of Page et al, (1989) with differential rearing of full and (maternal) half sisters 
from queen eggs was in fact “the result of a sampling bias in the Monte 
Carlo simulation we used” and state that “. . . a conclusive demonstration 
of nepotistic queen rearing remains elusive.” Noonan and Kolmes (1989) 
seem to leave room for social learning in preferential care of genetically 
different lines by saying that “. . . the patriline of worker brood given pref- 
erential treatment was not always the same as the patriline of the workers 
providing the brood care,” and “The more common patrilines of brood might 
sometimes provide a stronger stimulus for the tending workers and result 
in preferential care for brood of that patriline.” Carlin (1989) and Visscher 
and Seeley (unpublished) both imply that distinction of full and half sisters 
has yet to be demonstrated among honey bees in a fashion suggesting evolved 
kin recognition. Contrary to Sherman’s implications, then, arguments for 
self-referencing as an evolved kin recognition mechanism among social in- 
sects seem to have grown more doubtful within the past two years. 
Sherman next turns to ground squirrels, eventually citing Holmes’ 
(1986b) study as the rebuttal to my suggestion that self-referencing may not 
be needed to explain his and Holmes’ various results (see also, Holmes 1988). 
Holmes switched ground squirrels between litters as soon as possible after 
birth (l-3 days) to yield different proportions of related and unrelated nest- 
mates (both sexes included). In later dyadic tests with sisters and nonsisters 
reared apart from each other he found that proportions of nestmates of dif- 
ferent genotypes (related : unrelated) made no difference in agonism between 
matched unfamiliar pairs of sisters and nonsisters. As he noted, however 
(pp. 41, 43), he did not control for the possibility of juveniles learning from 
the mother’s phenotype. This means that no female was actually reared so 
as to be exposed, with respect to kin, to only her own phenotype. This fact 
is crucial, for it means that appropriate social learning was possible for at 
least one member of each tested pair in every test involving a female and 
her sister or a female and the sister of her nestmates. As he also noted, 
Holmes did not distinguish between the sexes in tabulating numbers of re- 
lated and unrelated nestmates for each female. Males of Belding’s ground 
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squirrels are not nepotistic, and females are evidently not nepotistic toward 
males (because males disperse). Thus, we have no reason to suspect, under 
a social learning model in which females are evolved to learn the actual 
identities of their female littermates, that the presence of male nestmates 
carried any significance at all for females, with regard to degrees of agonism 
shown later toward other female ground squirrels. It seems to me that from 
this omission alone the significance of the reported proportions of related 
and unrelated nestmates can be challenged. 
Suppose we temporarily ignore the problem of sex ratios. When unfa- 
miliar sisters were tested against one another (Holmes’ first kind of test), 
one of the two had been reared with the genetic mother of both and either 
an unrelated male or female (kin:nonkin = 1: 1) or both siblings and non- 
siblings (kin: nonkin = 1: 3, 2 : 3, 3 : 3, 3 : 2, 3 : 1). Depending on the extent of 
the mother’s influence, the test pair could have been asymmetrical in their 
responses to one another because one member of a pair had been reared by 
her genetic mother and may have learned from her mother’s phenotype. 
Holmes (personal communication) indicates that during dyadic tests a female 
tends to return the response initially given to her by her test partner; even 
if this effect is small it is important: different test pairs may be judged dif- 
ferently because either one or both individuals within a pair have changed 
responses to the other (see also, Holmes 1986a, p. 43). 
Thus, in this first kind of test one or two unfamiliar sisters tested against 
one another encounters an individual half (on average) like the mother by 
which she herself was raised and either half (when with at least one kin of 
her own, or when kin: nonkin > 1: n) or not at all (when k: nk = 1: n) like 
other individuals with which she was raised (i.e., depending on whether any 
of her littermates were her sisters or brothers-see below); the other sister 
encounters an individual either half like or unlike the nestmates with which 
she was raised and unlike the mother that raised her. In contrast, in the 
second test when unfamiliar nonsisters were tested against one another each 
would encounter a nonrelative unlike the mother that reared her but which 
was a sister of (some or all of) her nestmates. From a model of imperfect 
social learning this second situation would be expected to lead to greater 
agonism, and it did. The third case, and most agonistic, were unfamiliar 
females not reared with any relatives (mothers, sisters, or brothers) of the 
females against which they were tested; this result is also consistent with a 
social learning model. 
As noted, because of the mother’s possible influence, the first situation 
described above (unfamiliar sisters tested against one another) could en- 
gender an asymmetry in the two females’ responses to one another, lowering 
their degree of agonism if the lowered aggressive tendency of one of the two 
females affected the overall interaction between the two, as Holmes has 
suggested (1986, p. 43; personal communication). This possibility, based on 
an imperfect social learning model, must be eliminated before social learning 
not involving self-matching can be excluded as an explanation in this case. 
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For this interpretation it is not necessary, as Sherman claims, that pups in 
any of Holmes’ tests “learned only their dam’s phenotype and ignored the 
phenotypes of nestmates . , .” The familiar aspects of the mother’s phe- 
notype could affect a female’s interaction with her strange sister and her 
interaction with a nestmate could affect her response to an unfamiliar in- 
dividual related to that nestmate, and yield the results Holmes obtained. 
The result from Holmes’ tests that to me at first seemed puzzling from 
a social learning hypothesis are that previously non-associating sisters tested 
against one another after associating with different proportions of relatives 
and nonrelatives to not show significantly different degrees of agonism 
(Holmes 1988, Fig. 5). I tind it difficult to predict the results of this test, 
however, not only because numbers of individuals of the two sexes are not 
taken into account (see above), but also because (1) there are not merely 
differing proportions of related and unrelated young in each litter (1: 1; 1:3; 
2:3, 3:3, 3:2, 3: l), but also different numbers (2-6 per rearing cage, or, 
including mothers, 3-7), (2) the mothers’ phenotypes could cause an un- 
known (and possibly varying) degree of asymmetry in the sisters, responses 
to one another, and (3) the differing proportions of relatives and nonrelatives 
also cause different degrees of asymmetry between the rearing conditions 
of sisters matched against one another. Whether or not there are effects from 
any or all of these conditions is not known, but it seems to me reasonable 
to expect such effects. Thus, smaller litters might cause differences between 
individuals to be more stark and also increase the mother’s influence, par- 
ticularly in instances in which females’ only littermates are males. Greater 
asymmetry between the rearing conditions of females tested against one 
another might cause a greater or lesser amount of the agonism to depend 
on one of the two individuals’ initial responses to the other. Even with these 
reservations, looking at Holmes’ results (1988, Fig. 5), one sees that larger 
litters (2: 3, 3 : 3, 3 : 2) appear to show more agonism; the litter expected from 
social learning to yield the fewest agonistic encounters between unfamiliar 
sisters (3: 1) does and the litter expected to yield the most agonistic en- 
counters among the smaller litters (1: 3) does. Although none of these trends 
is statistically significant, they are in the right direction. 
The answers to the above questions could be derived by cross-fostering 
such that all juvenile ground squirrels are with an unrelated mother (and the 
female against which each is to be tested is not with the mother of the other 
individual to be tested), and such that litter size variations are minimized 
and asymmetries among numbers of relatives is maximized. It also seems 
necessary to me to analyze the data on the basis of associations between 
females only, excluding implications of equal effects from male juveniles. 
These modifications of the experiments would reduce asymmetries that 
might confound the results, eliminate effects from the possibility that the 
mother’s influence becomes more important as litter size is diminished, and 
test for social learning explicitly between females. 
The alternative to a social learning interpretation in comparing sister 
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and nonsister pairings is the unlikely one that only in the first set of tests 
(pairing female against unfamiliar sister), or at least in the particular in- 
stances when kin : nonkin = 1: n, did the squirrels use only their own phe- 
notypes. The phenotype of littermates could give no information that would 
reduce agonism, so to exclude social learning (assuming no biases from ef- 
fects of male nestmates) we would have to assume that exposure to their 
mothers’ phenotypes did not influence their responses. In the second kind 
of pairs (female against a nonsister that was a sister of the first female’s 
littermates) it is obvious that the squirrels did use the phenotypes of litter- 
mates. This interpretation derives from comparing the degree of agonism in 
the second set of tests with that in the third set of cases. It would therefore 
seem that no single hypothesis other than social learning (of both mothers’ 
and littermates’ phenotypes) can explain the relationship to one another of 
the results from these three kinds of pairs. I did not realize this in my earlier 
analysis because I did not fully understand the nature of Holmes’ results. 
As indicated earlier, there is another problem here. It is not clear that 
any species living in small social groups (such as sweat bees and ground 
squirrels) actually evolves to use either itself or its associates as references 
for the appropriate treatment of previously unencountered individuals. If, 
instead, individuals are simply learning the attributes of their associates as 
a part of treating those particular associates appropriately, and only learning 
enough to do this-hence, my hypothesis of “imperfect social learning” to 
explain results with strange individuals-then there also is no reason nec- 
essarily to expect particular responses to different proportions of one or 
another general kind of genotype (see below). 
Relying on an imperfect social learning hypothesis (and also showing 
greater prescience than we perhaps have a right to expect) one might have 
predicted (or not been surprised at) the results obtained by Sherman and 
Holmes (1985) with full and (maternal) half sisters (Alexander, 1990, p. 277). 
I doubt, however, that anyone would have expected to obtain the results of 
Holmes (1986a) with differing proportions of associates. Holmes’ (1986a,b) 
results seem to require that “amounts of time spent in the presence of sib- 
lings’ traits, number of times exposed to such traits, numbers of individuals 
associated with that carry the traits, or likelihood of encountering a specific 
trait . . . are all irrelevant to learning and remembering how to respond to 
relatives.” (Alexander 1990, p. 279). The interesting implication is that the 
necessary learning is accomplished very quickly, in one or a few learning 
experiences. To the extent this is true the question is raised whether, in 
Holmes’ experiments, the experiences may already have occurred before 
the juveniles were transferred to other litters l-3 days following birth. 
Without my realizing it, my initial thoughts were biased away from the 
idea of single-trial learning in the recognition of kin, I think because humans 
seem to learn continually and cumulatively about the phenotypes of their 
relatives, perhaps across their entire lives. On reflection, I can see that the 
(selective) reasons for this kind of cumulative or continual learning in humans 
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probably have to do with changes in phenotypes across lifetimes and the 
significance of such changes in dispensing nepotism and engaging in reci- 
procity in changing circumstances all through life. In any nepotistic organ- 
ism, however, including humans, the learning that actually establishes “rec- 
ognition” (or relationship) may be brief and specific, as with imprinting 
between parents and offspring in birds and mammals. In humans such brief 
learning events may be less likely to be thought important because they may 
never be conscious to either party, as evidently is the case with those that 
erase sexual interest between relatives (or nonrelatives) who associate 
closely while one or both of the two interactants is very young. 
Even in one-trial learning, there are difficulties in predicting the results 
of a test like that of Holmes (1986b). Suppose the animals are simply learning 
the particular individuals with which they are associating, and they use one 
or another trait do to this. Will they tend to use different traits for each 
individual, thereby distinguishing them better in later encounters? Or, if they 
are being favored simply for somehow learning the category of “sister,” 
and not for distinguishing individual sisters, then if they encounter the same 
trait repeatedly when learning about different individuals how likely is there 
to be a cumulative or reinforcing effect? Such questions about social learning 
can only be answered by further careful experimentation of the sort that 
Holmes, in particular, has attempted with ground squirrels. 
Honey bees and other large-colony eusocial forms are different from 
sweat bees and ground squirrels: they must respond appropriately not to 
one, two, or three siblings but to thousands, often including both full and 
half siblings, and in honeybees, 15 or 20 patrilines as well. One does not 
expect that such forms will evolve to respond to the attributes of individual 
nestmates. It appears that cues originating from the environment (and passed 
among individuals) are much more important to such “large-colony” social 
forms (e.g., Mintzer 1982). This suggests that permanent “gestalts” are not 
acquired by repeated encounters of the same (unchanging) traits shared by 
individuals through common genetic heritage, or that if this particular kind 
of gestalt is possible it is not useful within large-colony nests. 
Aside from possibilities that may still remain with respect to the above 
studies, in the context of evolved kin recognition only the results of Wu et 
al. (1980) with pig-tailed macaque paternal half siblings now seem not readily 
explainable by imperfect social learning. The macaque case may be in doubt 
not only because it has not been repeated but also because if evolved self- 
referencing occurs here it may reflect mate selection rather than kin rec- 
ognition; this is unlikely to be the case in Belding’s ground squirrels, in 
which only females have been shown to give special response to former 
associates (and assuming that males do indeed disperse irrevocably, as has 
been suggested). Indeed, it now seems to me appropriate to be skeptical that 
kin recognition has evolved to be accomplished by self-referencing in any 
species. This possibility does not necessarily support my argument (Alex- 
ander 1979, 1990) that self-referential phenotype matching in kin recognition 
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is theoretically unlikely; my bias in this respect, however, has been re- 
sponsible for the skepticism that caused me to pursue this topic. 
It is perhaps disappointing to some that exotic organisms appearing at 
first to accomplish amazing feats of kin recognition may actually be exhib- 
iting incidental effects of using a mechanism at least similar to those used 
by humans. This is particularly true because humans appear to use social 
learning (sometimes) at a considerably higher level of refinement, recogniz- 
ing large numbers of individuals and rarely mistaking one relative for another 
(Alexander 1990). There is little doubt that had ability to distinguish full and 
half sisters in ground squirrels been seen from the start as potentially ex- 
plainable as an incidental effect of imperfection in social learning, it would 
not have attracted as much attention. Once self-referencing had been hinted, 
moreover, the tendency to invoke it uncritically seems to have increased, 
with a concomitant tendency to underestimate the explanatory power of 
social learning models and overlook possibilities of social learning in ex- 
perimental situations. This effect may have contributed to assertions by 
prominent biologists, some quoted by Sherman, that particular kinds of kin 
recognition mechanisms are reasonable possibilities or that social learning 
cannot explain particular kinds of results. It has not helped that incidental 
effects of imperfect social learning-as, apparently, in both bees and ground 
squirrels-often give a superficial impression of uncanny recognition ca- 
pacities of a sort unknown in humans. (We do make the same kinds of 
mistakes, failing to distinguish strangers from associates they resemble, es- 
pecially when using the sometimes strikingly different attributes of persons 
from different geographic regions to distinguish them as individuals; because 
we do not often make this kind of mistake as an aspect of kin recognition, 
however, in that context it seems strange.) 
It seems possible, as well, that investigators convinced of the evolu- 
tionary importance of the concept of inclusive fitness have somehow be- 
lieved that the finding of a wide variety of mechanisms of kin recognition- 
and perhaps, especially, cryptic or unexpected ones-was either a support 
for their view of things or a requirement of it. Likewise, there has long been 
a tendency to believe, erroneously, that social learning is not a suitable 
adaptive mechanism, partly because learning has always seemed to many 
an alternative to specific underlying mechanisms for particular kinds of 
evolved behaviors or even a way of bypassing or superseding such mech- 
anisms. Thus, a prominent biologist in this field once became extremely 
angry with me for continuing to argue for a prevalence of social learning in 
kin recognition, exclaiming, “What about the distinguishing of full- and half- 
siblings in ground squirrels? I suppose you believe that is simply learned 
too!” This attitude, I believe, reflects the widespread assumption that learn- 
ing is more or less a blank slate phenomenon; it is the attitude responsible 
for some of the published arguments about the adaptiveness of learning that 
led me to write the 1990 paper. 
It is surprising that so many authors have consistently overlooked ob- 
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vious opportunities for social learning that could explain their results, and 
that reviewers are sometime reluctant to acknowledge their importance even 
after having had them called to their attention. This bias has been so powerful 
that some authors have written almost as though kin recognition by social 
learning is not kin recognition at all (e.g., Grafen 1990). Yet, through social 
learning and circumstantial evidence alone, humans evidently distinguish a 
far greater number of different kinds of relatives than does any other or- 
ganism. They accomplish this not only by learning about associates as in- 
dividuals but also by calculating the numbers of genetic linkages between 
themselves and other humans with whom they either associate directly or 
learn about indirectly (Alexander 1979: 43ff, 108ff, 144ff). 
I agree with Sherman that it is appropriate to consider the possibility 
of self-referencing in species with consistent large differences in relatedness 
among nestmates and other social interactants. The challenge, however, is 
to legitimate evolved self-referencing in the context of kin recognition. In 
ground squirrels, for example, the adaptive possibilities cannot be calculated 
merely by variations in relatedness among associates. They depend as well 
on such things as likelihoods of association of particular kinds of relatives 
and the importance of nepotism. If, for example, littermate sisters are less 
likely to associate than mothers and daughters (because sisters are less likely 
to survive than mothers), then we might expect that it is more important for 
a female to remember her mother than to learn something about her varying 
relationships to sisters. If nepotism also is trivial, then the regular presence 
of full and half sisters does not necessarily indicate potent selective pressure 
for distinguishing the two classes of relatives. My purpose is not to question 
all possibilities of evolved adaptiveness in the distinguishing of any particular 
kinds of relatives. Rather, I am expressing skepticism about particular kinds 
of adaptiveness, such as evolved abilities to recognize strange individuals, 
and particular mechanisms, such as self-referencing. Most specifically I 
challenge the supposition that opportunities for social learning have been 
excluded in any study to date that has demonstrated an effect more reason- 
ably interpretable as evolved kin recognition in the adaptive context of nep- 
otism than as functional in some other context such as sexual selection, 
incest avoidance, or exclusion of heterospecific interlopers. 
Unlike in some arguments on a topic of this sort, Paul Sherman, Warren Holmes, and I have 
discussed every disagreement endlessly and exchanged manuscripts and ideas at almost every 
stage. The interaction has been intense for almost a decade-sometimes shrill, sometimes hu- 
morous, but always friendly. In this particular instance Sherman and I have exchanged our 
manuscripts at every stage, and when possible blatantly utilized one another’s arguments to 
improve our own. Holmes also has patiently and repeatedly explained to me every detail of his 
experiments that I have asked about. Although it might seem that science would be better 
served if at some point the three of us had been able cooperatively to produce ajoint manuscript 
outlining the alternatives, perhaps not. Sometimes everyone benefits from a little of what the 
philosopher Jenny Teichman has called “the rooster factor.” 
I thank P. Kirk Visscher and Thomas D. Seeley for allowing me to see their unpublished 
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manuscripts, and Kyle Summers, John Pepper, and especially Warren Holmes for comments 
on the manuscript. 
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